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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ELECTORS OF THE PROPOSED
BODY CORPORATE, OF THE
TOWN OF COTTONWOOD CITY,

I

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY and WILLIAM E.
DUNN, PHILLIP R. BLOMQUIST, and RALPH Y. McCLURE, CONSTITUTING THE
MEMBERS OF SAID COMMISSION,

Case No.

12748

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action in mandamus to compel the Board
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County to approve
Appellants' petition for incorporation upon a finding that
the petition substantially conforms with the requirements
of the law of the State of Utah.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE JN LOWER COURT
The District Court denied Appellants' Writ of Man.
damus and dismissed the case with prejudice.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this Court issue an order
requiring the lower court to issue a Writ of Mandamus
compelling the Board of County Commissioners of Salt
Lake County to approve Appellants' petition in the absence of a finding by said Commission that Appellants'
petition substantially fails to comply with any of the requirements prescribed in Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Sec. 10-2-6.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants, who represent a majority of the electors of a proposed body corporate of the Town of Cott.onwood City on or about the 28th day of September, 1971,
pursuant to the statutory requirements of the Utah Code
Annotated, filed a Petition for Incorporation with the
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and
William E. Dunn, Chairman. The said Petition contained
the signatures of a majority of the electors residing in the
proposed Town, and attached thereto was a map showing
the boundaries of the proposed body corporate and a legal
description of the said area desired to be incorporated.
On or about October 4th, 1971, the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and William E. Dunn,
Chairman denied Appellants' Petition without stating the

basis for said denial. However, the Chairman William E.
Dunn stated prior to the denial that the Petition would
be denied solely on the basis of the loss of income that
would result to Salt Lake County if such Petition were
granted. Appellants have complied with all requirements
of the law governing the incorporation of towns and no
objections have been raised by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County regarding the procedure
or form employed by Appellants in presenting their Petition, nor have any defects in the Petition been claimed by
the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County.
Appellants contend that the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County has exceeded its statutory
authority by denying this Petition and further contend
that the County Commission's denial is arbitrary and
capricious and without foundation in the law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COUNTY COMMISSION'S ST AT U TORY DUTIES IN THE INCORPORATION
OF TOWNS ARE ONLY MINISTERIAL AND
NO DISC RE TI 0 NARY POWERS ARE
GRANTED TO THE COMMISSION.
Counties are a creation of the State Legislature and
as such they are vested only with those powers expressly
given them by the Legislature. Utah Code Annotated
(1953) Section 10-2-6 provides the method by which
towns are incorporated:
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'.'Whenever a majority of the electors of any un.
mcorporated town having a population of not less
one hundred and less than seven thousand
to _h_ave said town incorporated they may
file a petition for the purpose with the Board of
Commissioners, stating the legal descrip.
hon and boundaries of the territory desired to be
incorporated. On approval of such petition by the
said Board and the filing of a copy thereof with
the County Recorder such town shall constitute
a body corporate and politic under the name and
style proposed. The Board of Cow1ty Commissioners shall appoint the first president and Board
of Trustees, who shall hold office until the next
municipal election and until their successors are
elected and qualified."
The above statute grants the County Commission a
mere ministerial ascertainment that the statutory requirements have been complied with. The Statute does not
empower the Commission with discretionary authority to
disapprove the merits of incorporation since the Commission is merely directed to approve the petition, and not
the incorporation. The Commission's sole duties are to determine: (a) whether a majority of the electors have
signed the petition, (b) that the population is not less
than one hundred nor more than seven thousand, and (c)
that the Petition contains an adequate description of the
boundaries of the proposed area to be incorporated. An
elector, as used in this section, is a person over 21 years
of age who has been a citizen of the United States for
ninety days, and who has resided in the State one year,
in the county four months, and in the precinct sixty days.
(Constitution of Utah, Art. IV Sec. 2.)
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Although there are no Utah cases directly in point,
cases from other jurisdictions clearly illustrate the authority of similar officers under similar statutes. In State v.
Village of Gilbert, 120 N. W. 528, 107 Minn. 364 (1909),
an action was brought to have a village disincorporated
on the grounds that it was not a nucleus of population.
The Minnesota Supreme Court finally held that the Board
of County Commissioners had no discretion to determine
the reasonableness of incorporation. The Board only had
to approve if the Petition was in proper form and contained the requisite number of signatures. In so holding,
the Court states:
"In our examination of this class of cases we have
failed to discover any instance where such a body
has been vested with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers sufficient to consider and finally determine
the merits of the question (of incorporation) .
That the Legislature intended to introduce so radical a change is not warranted by the language of
the amendment." Id. at 553.
In State ex rel. Brunette v. Sutton, 71 N. D. 530, 3
N. W. 2d 106 (1942), it was noted that Courts frequently
observe that under incorporation statutes the non-legislative agency has ''little discretion in such matters". Id.
at 111. The Illinois Supreme Court in deciding a similar
case stated:
"Whether cities, towns or villages should be inof law or
corporated ... presents no
for judicial determination. It is purely a question
of policy to be determined by the
department." City of Galesbury v. Hawkinson, et al.,
75 Ill. 152, 157 (1874).
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Antieau, in his comprehensive multi-volume treatise
entitled Municipal Corporation Law, made the following
conclusion after analyzing the decisions of several st.ate
supreme courts:
Thus courts have sustained incorporation statutes
under which bodies other than the legislative determine whether there exists predescribed conditions, such as: Did the territory possess the requisite number of inhabitants? Was the petition
signed by a majority of the electors? And, did
the majority of the voters favor incorporation?
Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, Sec. 1.01
(Vol. I, p. 6); Citing People, ex rel. Rhodes v.
Fleming, 10 Colo. 553, 16 P. 298 ( 1887) ; Lynn v.
City of Payette, 38 Idaho 705, 224 P. 793 (1924);
et al.
In 62 Corpus Juris Secundum, Municipal Corporations, Section 22, several state statutes are construed and
the conclusion is that state statutes generally assign to
the county commissioners or to the courts the responsibility of determining whether there has been a compliance with the statutory requirements of incorporation,
such as the signing of the petition by the requisite number of persons and the existence of the requisite population in the proposed municipality. In several cases the
statutes have been interpreted as giving the county commissioner or the court only ministerial authority and if
it is found that the statutory requirements are met the
laws make it mandatory upon the board or court to approve incorporation. (State v. Downey, 430 P. 2d 122,
102 Ariz. 360; In re Village of Riggins, 200 P. 2d 1011, 68
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Idaho 547; State v. Incorporated Town of Spavinaw City,
300 P. 703, 150 Okla. 23; Attwood v. Board of Sup'rs of
Wayne County, 84 N. W. 2d 708, 349 Mich. 415. For further citations see 62 C. J. S. p. 101 note 93 and 43, C. J.
p. 94 note 81).
In determining the duty of the Commission in the
incorporation of towns, a comparison of the provisions
for the incorporation of cities should be made since there
is no rationale basis for different procedures to be required. Comparing the two procedures, the only major
differcnce is that in the incorporation of cities after the
petition is filed an election must be held and a majority
of the electors determines if the city is to be formed.
There are absolutely no discretionary duties granted to
the Commission and it acts merely as a ministerial agent
to determine whether the petition and election conform
to the provisions provided therein. In the case of incorporation of towns, inasmuch as a majority of the electors
must sign the petition, there is no need for an election since the petition states the will of the majority of the electors in the proposed town. There are
no reasonable distinguishing features between cities and
towns which support the contention that the County
Commissioners are granted discretionary powers to determine the merits of the incorporation in towns when
they are given no similar authority in the incorporation
of cities. It is therefore clear from an analysis of the entire municipal incorporation laws embodied in the Utah
Statutes that the Commissioners' duties in the incorpora-
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tion of cities and towns are purely ministerial and that
the will of the majority of the electors of the area deter.
mines whether the area is incorporated.

POINT II.
THE DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY TO COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ALLOWING THEM TO DECIDE THE
QUESTION OF INCORPORATION IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 0 F
LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
The Utah Constitution Article XI, Section 5 provides
that corporations for municipal purposes shall not be ere·
ated by special laws and that, "the legislature by general
laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and
classification of cities and towns in proportion to the pop·
ulations, which laws may be altered, amended, or repealed." The Utah courts have held that the legislative
power is vested in the Legislature and such legislative
power may not be delegated to other agencies except
where specially directed or permitted by the Constitution.
(State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 11 P. 2d 340.) The Utah
Supreme Court has also held that the creation of a city
and the fixing of its territorial limits is essentially a legislative and not a judicial function. (Plutas Min. Co. v.
Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132.)
Pursuant to the above Constitutional provisions and
judicial interpretations, it is clear that the legislative function of incorporating cities and towns cannot be delegated
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in the absence of a Constitutional provision authorizing
such delegation.
In the Plutas Min. case, supra, in interpreting the
scope of authority given to the Court in the disconnection
proceedings of Utah Code Annotated 10-4-1 (1953 as
amended), the Court held that the Legislature may delegate to the judiciary its authority to restrict corporate
limits of a city. But the Court also held that since the
changing of the territorial limits is primarily a legislative
function, Courts are bound to confine the exercise of the
power conferred upon them by the Legislature within
the expressed or necessary implied language of the act
so conferring such power. The Court found it necessary
to state that the statutory guidelines rather than the
Court's discretion, must be followed in the disconnection
process. Consequently, it is clear that if the Legislature
is to delegate any of its authority in municipal incorporation matters it must provide substantial statutory guidelines and the delegee of the authority must strictly adhere
to the guidelines rather than substituting its own discretion.
The above principle was reiterated in In re Town of
West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P. 2d 105 (1958) in
which the Court stated:
"Even though the changing of the territorial limits
of a municipal corporation is primarily a legislative
function, the disconnection of lands under this section involves the ascertainment of facts to determine the conditions upon which the law is to t.ake
effect, and this is a judicial function."
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In that case the Court recognized that some authority
was delegated to the Courts in ascertaining whether a
specific set of facts fit within the specific guidelines given
by the Legislature. However, even in disconnection proceedings the Court is strongly limited in the exercise of
its discretion, and its only function is in essence ministerial, i.e. the ascertainment of facts.
This Court made the above conclusion in a similar
case in Carter v. Beaver County, Service Area No. One,
16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P. 2d 440 (1965), in which the County
Service Area Act was declared unconstitutionally vague
in that it delegated unlimited authority to the County
Commission without providing the necessary guidelines
or standards by which the Commission could determine
its functions.
Indeed Courts frequently observe that under the in·
corporation statutes a non-legislative agency has little dis·
cretion in such matters, Antieau, Municipal Corporations
Law, Vol. I Section 1.01. This principle was again sum·
marized in Attwood v. Board of Sup'rs of Wayne County,
84 N. W. 2d 708, 349 Mich. 415:
"The creation of municipal corporations is univer·
sally acknowledged to be strictly a legislative func·
tion, and it is the general view that the legislature
cannot, without violating the rule 'delegatus non
potest delegare', delegate to another agency the
authority to create municipal corporations, when·
ever and wherever such agency may deem proper,
or according to whatever conditions
tribu_nal
or board may see fit to require or dispense with.
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The question of incorporation being a legislative
one, statutes will be construed in case of any doubt
to deny the administrative board any discretion
to pass upon the merits or reasonableness of the
petition for incorporation." (Emphasis added.)
The obvious reason for interpreting incorporation
statutes to deny the administrative board any discretion
to pass upon the merits or reasonableness of the petition
for incorporation, is an effort to avoid the Constitutional
issue involved. It is a well settled principle that courts
will construe statutes wherever possible to uphold their
Constitutionality. "To save incorporation statutes Courts
will read in the conditions that the court or commission
has no discretion in regard to ::-efusing or granting the
petition for incorporation." Antieau, Municipal Corporations Law, Vol. I Section 1.01 citing State, ex rel. Behrens
v. Crisman, 354 Mo. 174, 188 S. W. 2d 937 (1945); State,
ex rel. Williams v. Second Judicial District Court, 30 Nev.
225, 94 P. 70 (1908).
If Utah Code Annotated Section 10-2-6 (1953) is interpreted broadly giving the County Commissioners discretionary powers without the required guidelines, it is
indeed an unconstitutional delegation of Legislative
power. Therefore, in order to preserve its constitutionality it must be strictly interpreted to deny the County
Commission any discretion to pass upon the merits or
reasonableness of the petition for incorporation.

POINT III.
A CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS OF
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APPELLANTS' INCORPORATION p ET I TION BY THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
RESULTS IN A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
VI SECTION 26, AND ARTICLE XI SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Article VI Section 26 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any
private or special laws in the following cases: .. .
12. Incorporating cities, towns or villages ... .
Article XI Section 5 provides:
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be
created by special laws. The legislature by general
laws shall provide for the incorporation, organiza.
tion and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws may be altered,
amended or repealed....
The test of whether a law is a general law or a special
law is determined by its application. (See Words and
Phrases, General Laws. See also Antieau, Municipal Cor·
poration Law Vol I Sec. 2-12). It follows that the test of
whether the Legislature has passed a general law regarding the incorporation of towns, is to determine whether
the application of the law is general and uniform in all
instances. Courts have long upheld the right of the Legislature to classify cities by population as long as the classifications are reasonable and consistent with their intended purpose. Therefore, appellants do not challenge
the Legislature's right to classify municipalities into several classes of cities and towns. However as stated in
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Higgins v. Johnson County Commissioners, 153 Kan. 560,
112 P. 2d 128 (1941):
a classification is made on the basis of population . . . (and) all counties and cities which
come within the population class cannot come
within the provisions of the act, it is not a general
law."
Clearly, in order for Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Section 10-2-6, to be considered a general law, all proposed
towns having a population of more than 100 and less than
7,000 which submit a petition substantially complying
with the provisions stated therein, must be allowed to incorporate. In the absence of a Legislative instruction to
consider other standards or criteria, this incorporation
must be allowed regardless of the economic or other impact on the county. If the county is given unlimited discretion to consider the merits of the incorporation without
any guidelines from the Legislature, the application of
the law is by no means general. Indeed, the Commission
will determine its own standards or criteria with each
petition, and incorporation of towns will be based solely
upon the ideas of the particular Commissioners in office
rather than upon general, uniform laws prescribed by the
Legislature. The result is a government of men rather
than of laws, and the granting of unlimited discretion
cannot lead to incorporation by general laws as required
by the Utah Constitution. This Court has already ruled
in Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. One, supra,
that the unlimited delegation of discretion or authority
from the Legislature to the county is unconstitutional.
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The result in this case is similar if the county is allowed
to consider any criteria or standards it deems appropriate
in allowing towns to incorporate.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the legislative scheme for the incorporation of cities and towns that the Board of County
Commissioners' duties with respect to processing a petition for incorporation are purely ministerial. In the case
of town incorporation a majority of the electors must sign
the petition and therefore the will of the electors is determined at the outset and no election is necessary. If
the statutory requirements are complied with by the petition and if the signators represent a majority of the qualified electors in the proposed town area, the County Commission must approve the petition and the town is incorporated. The statute provides no discretionary authority for the Commission to question the merits of the incorporation of cities or towns.

Furthermore, the authority to regulate the incorporation of the cities and towns is vested solely in the Legislature and it would be an unconstitutional delegation of responsibility to vest in the County Commissioners discretionary authority to consider, without any guidelines, the
merits of a petition for incorporation.

1
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In addition, the Utah Constitution requires cities and
towns to be incorporated by general laws and if the county is allowed unlimited discretion to consider the merits
of each incorporation, the effect of the law is not general
but is rather special.
The Appellants respectfully request that this Court
issue an order requiring the lower court to issue a Writ of
Mandamus requiring the Board of County Commissioners
of Salt Lake County to perform their ministerial duties
and approve Appellants' incorporation petition upon a
finding that it substantially complies with the law.
Respectfully submitted,
HUNT, WALKER & HINTZE, Inc.

..

M. RICHARD WALKER
.4.ttorney for Petitioners

